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CIVIL RIGHTS/ANTI-DISCRIMINATION—I DIDN’T VOLUNTEER FOR
THIS: A SOLUTION FOR PROTECTING VOLUNTEERS FROM
DISCRIMINATION IN MASSACHUSETTS
Joseph D. Greenhalgh*
Many have volunteered in some way or another. Volunteers
seek to help others and to improve themselves. Unfortunately,
if volunteers are discriminated against due to membership in a
protected class, whether actual or perceived, they have very
limited protections afforded to them.
Few jurisdictions have examined what, if any, protections
against discrimination should be available to volunteers.
Federal circuit courts are conflicted regarding the
circumstances under which volunteers should be protected
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. A small
number of states have examined whether volunteers should be
protected under state public accommodation antidiscrimination statutes, with an even smaller number
concluding that they should be protected under limited
circumstances. Nevertheless, none of these solutions would be
sufficient in Massachusetts because the protections they provide
are so narrowly applied.
Massachusetts has not examined whether anti-discrimination
protections should be expanded for volunteers. When someone
is not allowed to volunteer, he is denied multiple benefits he
would receive by volunteering. This Note argues that when
someone is not allowed to volunteer at a place of public
accommodation because of his membership or perceived
membership in a protected class, he should be protected under
the Massachusetts public accommodation anti-discrimination
law without the limitations that are present in other states.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following scenario: John and Jim are walking past the
local food pantry and see a sign asking for volunteer help. The two men
enter the food pantry to volunteer their time and serve meals to the
homeless. The manager of the food pantry, believing John and Jim are a
couple, tells them that the food pantry does not allow gay men to
volunteer. John and Jim neither admit nor deny that they are a couple, but
the manager nevertheless does not allow them to volunteer.
Having benefited from the food pantry’s services in the past, the men
are upset and still want to help. While leaving the building, they see a
notice stating that donations are always accepted. The next day, John and
Jim bring five bags of non-perishable foods and a check for $200.00 to
donate to the food pantry. The manager of the food pantry refuses John
and Jim’s donation because the homosexual lifestyle is against her
personal belief. John and Jim are upset because they were denied the
ability to volunteer and make a donation; they seek legal help to determine
their possible options for responding.
Nearly half of all Americans claim to have engaged in some kind of
volunteer effort,1 and about 25 percent of Massachusetts residents
volunteer.2 In Massachusetts, there are three possible statutes under which
a victim of discrimination may bring a claim: the Massachusetts civil
rights statute, the Massachusetts employment anti-discrimination statute,
and the Massachusetts public accommodation anti-discrimination statute.3
Unfortunately, volunteers are currently unable to bring discrimination
claims under the Massachusetts employment anti-discrimination statute,
as case law has restricted its scope.4 Massachusetts courts have not yet
addressed whether a volunteer can bring a claim under the public
accommodations anti-discrimination statutes.5 Elsewhere, the few states
that have ruled on whether volunteers can bring claims under public
accommodation anti-discrimination statutes vary in their holdings.6
1.
2.

ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE 118 (2000).
Volunteering and Civic Engagements in Massachusetts, CORP. FOR NAT’L &
COMMUNITY SERV., http://www.volunteeringinamerica.gov/MA [https://perma.cc/77ZQKYJY] [hereinafter Volunteering in MA].
3. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, §§ 11H–I (2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4
(2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (2016).
4. Comey v. Hill, 438 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Mass. 1982).
5. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (2016).
6. See generally Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts, Inc. v. Comm’n on Human Rights &
Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352 (Conn. 1987) (holding Connecticut’s public accommodation antidiscrimination statute does not cover someone offering her own services); Dale v. Boy Scouts
of Am., 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999) (holding that an openly homosexual male not allowed to be
a scout leader can bring a claim under public accommodation anti-discrimination law), rev’d
for First Amendment concerns, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Johnson v. Plasma All., No. C2-99-1261,
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Volunteers in Massachusetts are currently limited to common law
remedies and potential claims under the Massachusetts civil rights
statute.7 Therefore, Massachusetts greatly limits the protections and
avenues for recourse available to John and Jim.
In federal courts, circuits are split with regard to when a volunteer
would be protected under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8 The
First Circuit, which encompasses Massachusetts, has not yet made a
determination with regard to when Title VII protections would extend to
volunteers.9 Regardless of the First Circuit’s determination, the
protections of Title VII would have limited reach, as they would apply
only to volunteers who offer their services and who assume the status of
“employee.”10 Because courts have held that Title VII applies to
employers discriminating against employees, it would only protect those
volunteers who receive employee status, excluding volunteers who do not
receive employee status or who donate money or goods.11 Therefore,
receiving the benefits of Title VII is contingent upon the context in which
the volunteering occurs.12
For the purposes of this Note, volunteers are divided into two classes:
service volunteers and donor volunteers. John and Jim exemplified
service volunteers when they offered to help serve food, and donor
volunteers when they attempted to give money and non-perishables.
Service volunteers are those who offer their time and services. Donor
volunteers, in contrast, are those who make donations. Both types of
volunteers receive benefits for their efforts, including physical, mental,
2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 502 (Minn. Ct. App. May 23, 2000) (analyzing whether a plasma
donation center discriminated against a donor under a public accommodation antidiscrimination ordinance); Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. State ex rel West Va. Human
Rights Comm’n, 309 S.E.2d 342 (W.Va. 1983) (holding a volunteer fire department refusing to
allow a female volunteer violated the public accommodation anti-discrimination statute).
7. See Lowery v. Klemm, 845 N.E.2d 1124, 1131 (Mass. 2006); see also MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 12, §§ 11H–I (2016) (protecting constitutional rights from being interfered with using
threats, intimidation, or coercion, or attempted threats, intimidation, or coercion).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2014). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
implemented to provide employees with federal protections against employment discrimination
based on race, color, national origin, religion, and sex. See generally id. Michael H. Rubenstein,
Our Nation’s Forgotten Workers: The Unprotected Volunteers, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 147,
171 (2006). Compare Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 2013)
(requiring a threshold remuneration test before analyzing whether a volunteer should be granted
employee status), with Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 656 F.3d 348 (6th Cir.
2011) (considering remuneration as one of multiple factors equally weighed when determining
whether a volunteer should be granted employee status).
9. Keiko Rose, Volunteer Protection under Title VII: Is Remuneration Required?, 2014
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 605, 625 (2014).
10. Id. at 607.
11. See id. at 608–09.
12. See id. at 607–09.
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emotional, sociological, professional, and financial benefits.13 If someone
is denied the ability to volunteer due to discriminatory animus, he is also
denied these benefits. This Note argues that the Massachusetts public
accommodation anti-discrimination statute should provide protections to
anyone who is denied the opportunity to volunteer in a place of public
accommodation based on actual or perceived membership in a protected
class, because denial of the benefits a volunteer would receive equates to
denial of advantages and privileges afforded to others outside the
protected class.14 Public policy supports increased protections for
volunteers, given that volunteers not only receive benefits themselves, but
they also provide benefits to the community.15
Part I of this Note provides background information exploring how
federal courts could apply Title VII to protect volunteers from
discrimination. This part first addresses the general rule that volunteers
are not afforded the protections of Title VII in federal jurisdictions due to
lack of standing, because volunteers are not employees. Part I then
examines the exception to the general rule and the circuit split regarding
the test used when determining whether a volunteer should receive
employee status. This part explains why neither approach—requiring
remuneration or considering remuneration as part of a balancing test in
determining whether someone is an employee—provides sufficient
protection for volunteers in Massachusetts.

13. See, e.g., Mark Horoszowski, 5 Surprising Benefits Of Volunteering, FORBES (Mar.
19, 2015, 1:22 PM), http://www forbes.com/sites/nextavenue/2015/03/19/5-surprisingbenefits-of-volunteering/#3bddb14f7c76 (click next to progress through list) [hereinafter
Horoszowski, 5 Surprising Benefits] [http://perma.cc/Z6R5-QH9F]; Alan Feigenbaum, Benefits
From
Giving,
FORBES
(June
18,
2007,
1:00
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2007/06/18/donations-charity-taxes-pf-educationin_af_0618soapbox_inl html [http://perma.cc/A7A5-BJPL].
14. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (2016). Massachusetts prohibits discrimination
in a place of public accommodation “on account of race, color, religious creed, national origin,
sex, sexual orientation, . . . any physical or mental disability or ancestry . . . .” Id.
Discrimination on the basis of gender identity, which includes transgender status, has fallen
under the category of sex discrimination for purposes of Title VII. Sex-Based Discrimination,
U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/sex.cfm
[https://perma.cc/BV6Y-4Q5W]. Additionally, sexual harassment is considered a form of sex
discrimination for purposes of Title VII. Facts About Sexual Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-sex.cfm
[https://perma.cc/ZF3T-PMSW].
15. See, e.g., Gae-Lynn Woods, Why Is it Important to Do Volunteer Work?,
LIVESTRONG.COM (May 31, 2015), http://www.livestrong.com/article/190888-why-is-itimportant-to-do-volunteer-work/
[https://perma-archives.org/warc/YC9B-FL22/http://
www.livestrong.com/article/190888-why-is-it-important-to-do-volunteer-work]; Community
Service: Top 10 Reasons to Volunteer, U.C. SAN DIEGO, https://students.ucsd.edu/studentlife/involvement/community/reasons html (last updated Aug. 2, 2016) [https://perma.cc/F9B82UAA].
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Part II of this Note examines the differing views among states with
regard to whether state public accommodation anti-discrimination statutes
afford protections to volunteers against discrimination. Next, this part
looks at the varied holdings of the four state courts that have addressed
this question. This part also explores why none of these approaches on
their own would be adequate solutions in Massachusetts.
Part III of this Note presents a solution that ensures all volunteers in
Massachusetts are properly protected from discrimination. This part
begins with an analysis of what constitutes a place of public
accommodation in Massachusetts. Part III also addresses what protections
the Massachusetts public accommodation anti-discrimination statutes
provide. Next, this part examines the various benefits that volunteers
receive as a result of their efforts, and explains why the discriminatory
denial of these benefits may amount to a violation of the Massachusetts
public accommodation anti-discrimination statutes. Finally, this part
addresses why allowing volunteers to bring claims under the public
accommodation anti-discrimination statutes is in the best interest of the
Commonwealth for public policy reasons.
I.

CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE VOLUNTEERS ARE PROTECTED UNDER
TITLE VII

Congress implemented Title VII to combat workplace
discrimination.16 Generally, Title VII does not protect volunteers due to
lack of standing on the grounds that they are not employees, and,
therefore, are outside the scope of the statute.17 However, in some
circumstances, volunteers have been deemed to have employee status,
thus falling within the scope of Title VII protections.18 Title VII circularly
defines “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer.”19 Title
VII defines “employer” as “a person who is engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . and any agent
of such a person.”20 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “employer” as “[a]
person, company, or organization for whom someone works . . . .”21

16. Rose, supra note 9, at 607.
17. Id.; see also Standing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Standing is “[a]
party’s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.” Id. “To
have standing in federal court, a plaintiff must show (1) that the challenged conduct has caused
the plaintiff actual injury, and (2) that the interest sought to be protected is within the zone of
interests meant to be regulated by the statutory or constitutional guarantee in question.” Id.
18. Rose, supra note 9, at 607.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2014).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2014). An agent is “[s]omeone who is authorized to act for or
in place of another; a representative[.]” Agent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
21. Employer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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Thus, should Title VII apply to volunteers, it would likely apply solely to
service volunteers and not donor volunteers.22
A.

General Rule for Determining Whether a Volunteer is Considered
an Employee under Title VII

To determine whether a volunteer is an employee under Title VII,
courts have adopted the common law agency test presented in Community
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid.23 Because Title VII does not apply to
independent contractors, the Court in Reid applied the common law
agency test in determining whether an artist would be considered an
employee or an independent contractor.24 The question of employment
was pertinent in determining whether the artist was considered an
employee for purposes of the Copyright Act of 1976.25 The artist was not
a regular employee of the company that commissioned him for a sculpture,
but the Court analyzed whether the artist should be considered an
employee for purposes of the Copyright Act, and therefore, whether the
sculpture was a work made for hire.26
In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the
common law agency test, the Court in Reid considered various factors,
which are useful in determining whether a volunteer is granted employee
status.27 These factors included whether the hiring party had control over
how tasks were accomplished, what skills were required to complete the
tasks, and the source of the tools used in completion of the tasks. 28 The
Court also looked at the length of the relationship between the hiring party
and the worker; whether the hiring party was able to assign additional

22. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2014) (defining employee); 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b) (2014);
Employer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
23. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989);
Rubenstein, supra note 8.
24. Reid, 490 U.S. at 751. Accord Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318,
323–24 (1992); cf. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 791 F.3d 376, 385 (2d Cir. 2015)
(“[Regarding whether interns are employees,] the proper question is whether the intern or the
employer is the primary beneficiary of the relationship . . . .”).
25. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b) (2014); Reid, 490 U.S. at 732–733. While Reid examined
whether someone was an employee for purposes of the Copyright Act of 1976, the test used
could also be used in other cases where it is important to determine whether someone is an
employee. See id.
26. Reid, 490 U.S. at 738. “A ‘work made for hire’ is . . . prepared by an employee
within the scope of his or her employment; or . . . specially ordered or commissioned for use as
a contribution to a collective work.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2014). Additionally, in other specific
situations, a work could be considered a “work made for hire” when a written instrument is
signed by the parties showing an agreement that the work is to be considered a work made for
hire. Id.
27. See id. at 751.
28. Id.
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tasks to the worker; whether the worker could determine how long he
worked; and how the worker was paid.29 Finally, the Court factored in
whether the worker could hire and pay an assistant; whether the work
being done was part of the hiring party’s normal type of business; whether
the worker received employee benefits as a result of his working for the
hiring party; the tax treatment of the worker; and whether the hiring party
was still in business.30
After weighing the factors, the Court determined the artist was an
independent contractor and not an employee.31 Although Reid provided a
test for determining whether a hired party is an employee under Title VII,
there is disagreement regarding one key component of the test.32
B.

Circuit Split Regarding Whether Remuneration is a Threshold
Factor to Overcome before Applying the Common Law Agency Test

Circuits are split with regard to whether remuneration is a factor to
consider in the common law agency test for employee status, or whether
the question of remuneration is a threshold that must be surpassed before
the test is considered.33 “Remuneration” is defined as “[p]ayment;
compensation, esp[ecially] for a service that someone has performed.”34
Whereas a small number of circuits consider remuneration as a factor in
the common law agency test, the majority of circuits consider
remuneration as a threshold test that must be overcome before considering
the common law agency test.35
Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Department, Inc.36 serves as an
example of how the minority of circuits view remuneration in relation to
the common law agency test.37 Bryson addressed whether workers who
only receive de minimis benefits are considered employees under Title
VII.38 Marcia Bryson, an employee for the Middlefield Volunteer Fire
Department, filed charges alleging discrimination on the basis of sex and

29. Id.
30. Id. at 751–52.
31. Id. at 752.
32. See Rose, supra note 9, at 607.
33. See id.
34. Remuneration, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
35. Rose, supra note 9, at 607. “The Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits have adopted a . . . threshold-remuneration test.” Id. at 615. “The Sixth and Ninth
Circuits . . . view remuneration as only one, non-dispositive factor in conjunction with the other
common law agency test factors.” Id. at 623.
36. 656 F.3d 348 (6th Cir. 2011).
37. See Rose, supra note 9, at 623.
38. Bryson, 656 F.3d at 351.
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retaliation.39 The firefighters in the department were considered volunteer
members as opposed to employees.40 Bryson originally joined the
department as a volunteer member, but later was hired as an employee in
the role of administrative assistant.41 In determining whether to consider
the firefighters as employees for purposes of Title VII, the district court
viewed compensation as a necessary requirement before considering the
common law agency test.42 As a result, the district court granted partial
summary judgment for the fire department, concluding the department did
not have enough employees to support a Title VII claim.43 The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the granting of summary judgment,
determining that while remuneration is a factor that must be considered, it
should only be weighed as a factor in the common law agency test and
should not be an initial hurdle for plaintiffs to overcome.44
In contrast, Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire District No. 545
exemplifies the majority view among circuits, finding that a volunteer
must receive remuneration before the court will look to the common law
agency test.46 Rachel Juino was a volunteer firefighter who filed charges
under Title VII alleging sexual harassment and retaliation.47 Because the
Fifth Circuit had not previously adopted a test for determining whether a
volunteer should be granted employee status, the district court opted for
the threshold remuneration test.48 The court of appeals considered both
approaches for determining whether a volunteer should receive employee
status; ultimately, the court of appeals agreed with the district court and
adopted the threshold remuneration test.49 The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded Juino was not an employee under Title VII because
she “failed to make a threshold showing of remuneration.”50 The court of
appeals further stated that it is Congress’s prerogative to provide a remedy
to volunteers in Juino’s position if it wishes to do so, thereby allowing for
protection under Title VII; it is not for the court to provide the remedy. 51
39. Id. at 350.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 351. The issue of whether Bryson’s claim would fall under Title VII hinged
on whether the volunteer members were considered employees, as Title VII requires a business
to have fifteen employees. See id. at 350.
43. Id. at 351.
44. Id. at 355–56.
45. 717 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 2013).
46. See Rose, supra note 9, at 615.
47. Juino, 717 F.3d at 432.
48. Id. at 433.
49. Id. at 439.
50. Id. at 440.
51. Id. at 439.
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The First Circuit has not made a decision regarding whether
remuneration should be a threshold requirement when applying the
common law agency test to volunteers.52 Nevertheless, the First Circuit
has used the common law agency test in cases not involving volunteers.53
For example, in Lopez v. Massachusetts, the court used the common law
agency test to determine whether the Massachusetts Human Resources
Division is an employer of municipal police officers.54 The issue arose
after minority police officers brought a claim of disparate impact under
Title VII.55 Because the police officers brought suit against the
Commonwealth, it was necessary to determine whether the officers were
employees of the Massachusetts Human Resources Division.56 The First
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that the United States Supreme Court
had stated, when a statute containing the term “employee” does not define
the term, “a court must presume that Congress has incorporated traditional
agency law principles for identifying ‘master-servant relationships.’”57 In
applying the common law agency test, the court concluded that the
Massachusetts Human Resources Division is not the plaintiffs’ employer
for purposes of Title VII.58
In contrast, the court in Mahoney v. Morgan examined whether the
defendant was an employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act.59
Mahoney worked for Morgan in a veterinary hospital and alleged that
Morgan failed to provide reasonable accommodations to help alleviate
symptoms of Mahoney’s disability while she was working.60 Morgan
eventually terminated Mahoney’s employment.61
Morgan argued that she did not have enough employees to support a
52. Rose, supra note 9, at 625. “The First, Third, and Seventh Circuits have not yet ruled
on this issue.” Id.
53. See generally Lopez v. Massachusetts, 588 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2009); Mahoney v.
Morgan, No. 08-10879-MBB, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97224 (D. Mass. Sept. 16, 2010).
54. Lopez, 588 F.3d at 83.
55. Id. at 72. Disparate impact is “[t]he adverse effect of a facially neutral practice . . .
that nonetheless discriminates against persons because of their [membership in a protected
class] and that is not justified by business necessity.” Disparate Impact, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
56. Lopez, 588 F.3d at 72.
57. Id. at 83 (citing, inter alia, Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538
U.S. 440, 444–47 (2003)). In this context, “master-servant” refers to an employer-employee
relationship. Id. at 83 n.13.
58. Id. at 85.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B) (2014); Mahoney v. Morgan, No. 08-10879-MBB, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97224, at *16 (D. Mass. Sept. 16, 2010). The definitions of “employee” and
“employer” are substantially similar under both Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities
Act. Id. at *17.
60. Mahoney, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97224, at *6–7.
61. Id. at *7.
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claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act.62 For that reason, the
court applied the common law agency test to multiple workers in order to
determine whether they were employees under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, and consequently, whether Morgan was an employer
under the Americans with Disabilities Act.63 In its analysis, the court
addressed how the common law agency test does not present a clear
formula for determining employee status, and therefore “all of the
incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one
factor being decisive.”64 The court ultimately determined a reasonable
jury using the common law agency test could find that many of the
workers were employees,65 and, as a result, denied Morgan’s motion for
summary judgment.66
Whereas Lopez and Mahoney do not address whether remuneration
should be a threshold test when determining a volunteer’s employee status
in the First Circuit, the cases nevertheless may indicate how courts in the
First Circuit might rule on the matter in the future.67 In Lopez, the court
emphasized that employee status “under Title VII must be determined by
the ‘actual circumstances of the person’s relationship’ with the defendant
and not just the label.”68 This statement emphasizes the view that a worker
need not be labeled as an employee to obtain employee status.69 Similarly,
the court in Mahoney said “lack of evidence of payment . . . is not
necessarily a bar to a determination of employee status . . . . A volunteer
may be covered . . . if he is receiving benefits.”70 This implies the First
Circuit would not require a threshold remuneration test prior to applying
the common law agency test for volunteers.71
C.

Whichever Test the First Circuit Adopts, the Protections for
Volunteers in Massachusetts Will Still Be Insufficient
Whichever determination the First Circuit makes on this issue, it will

62. Id. at *16–17. Both Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act define an
employer as having fifteen or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2014).
63. Mahoney, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97224 at *20–30.
64. Id. at *20 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992)).
65. Id. at *29–30.
66. Id. at *33.
67. See generally Lopez v. Massachusetts, 588 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2009); Mahoney, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97224.
68. Lopez, 588 F.3d at 86 (quoting Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 987 (1st Cir.
1997)).
69. See id. at 86.
70. Mahoney, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97244 at *23 (citing U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NEW COMPLIANCE MANUAL, ¶ 7110, § 2-III (A)(1)(c) (2009)).
71. See id. (citing U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NEW COMPLIANCE
MANUAL, ¶ 7110, § 2-III (A)(1)(c) (2009)).
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not provide a satisfactory solution for volunteer protections in
Massachusetts, because the common law agency test would only apply to
service volunteers.72 Regardless of whether the First Circuit applies the
threshold remuneration test or consider remuneration solely as a factor in
the common law agency test, potential Title VII protection would not
apply to donor volunteers because they cannot satisfy the common law
agency test elements.73
Additionally, should the First Circuit adopt either test for
determining employment status under Title VII, the test would not likely
extend to state laws in Massachusetts.74 Massachusetts has intimated that
in state courts, volunteers cannot bring a discrimination claim under the
Massachusetts employment anti-discrimination laws.75 In Comey v. Hill,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court determined whether
Massachusetts law considers an independent contractor an employee.76
Comey brought a claim alleging age discrimination under the
Massachusetts employment anti-discrimination statute.77
Comey
contested the superior court judge’s instruction that distinguished an
independent contractor from an employee with regard to the scope of the
Massachusetts employment anti-discrimination law.78
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated that “[i]n the
absence of any indication to the contrary, we will not assume that the
Legislature intended to cover relationships outside the traditional common
law employer-employee relationship.”79 This holding is significant
because a volunteer would not fit into the traditional employer-employee
relationship.80 Therefore, regardless of the First Circuit’s eventual
determination on how to ascertain whether a volunteer should be granted
employee status, the solution would be inadequate as it would only be
functional in federal courts and would not extend into the Massachusetts
state courts.
II. ABILITY OF VOLUNTEERS TO BRING DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
UNDER STATE PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

72. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989).
73. See id.
74. See Comey v. Hill, 438 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Mass. 1982).
75. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (2016); Comey, 438 N.E.2d at 814.
76. Comey, 438 N.E.2d at 814.
77. Id. at 812–13.
78. Id. at 813–14.
79. Id. at 814.
80. See id. “We will not depart from the common law definition of employee absent a
legislative substitute.” Id.
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STATUTES
Various states have implemented public accommodation antidiscrimination laws for the purpose of preventing discrimination in places
of public accommodation.81 Massachusetts defines a place of public
accommodation as “any place, whether licensed or unlicensed, which is
open to and accepts or solicits the patronage of the general public . . . .”82
Five states do not have laws preventing discrimination in places of public
accommodation: Texas, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and North
Carolina.83 Only three states—Connecticut, New Jersey, and West
Virginia—have judicial opinions reflecting whether a volunteer can bring
a discrimination claim under statutes governing discrimination in a place
of public accommodation are Connecticut, West Virginia, and New
Jersey.84 These states’ holdings have encompassed decisions both
disallowing the claims85 and allowing volunteers to bring claims under the
public accommodation anti-discrimination statutes.86 Additionally,
Minnesota has examined whether a volunteer can bring a discrimination
claim under a city ordinance governing discrimination in a place of public
accommodation.87
A.

Service Volunteers in Connecticut

Connecticut analyzed whether a service volunteer could bring a
claim under the public accommodation anti-discrimination statute in
Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights &
Opportunities.88 Catherine Pollard volunteered with the Boy Scouts in

81.
Discrimination
in
Public
Accommodations,
FINDLAW,
http://
civilrights findlaw.com/enforcing-your-civil-rights/discrimination-in-publicaccommodations html [http://perma.cc/KKT5-7TY2]. There are federal statutes prohibiting
discrimination in a place of public accommodation; however, the issue of whether these statutes
would apply to a volunteer have not been addressed. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2014).
82. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (2016). See also infra Section III.A. Generally,
statutes defining “place of public accommodation” will also provide a non-exhaustive list of
examples of places of public accommodation. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2014); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (2016).
83. State Public Accommodation Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (July 13,
2016), http://www ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-public-accommodationlaws.aspx [https://perma.cc/5S95-YVPK].
84. See generally Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts, Inc. v. Comm’n on Human Rights &
Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352 (Conn. 1987); Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J.
1999) rev’d for First Amendment concerns, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Shepherdstown Volunteer
Fire Dep’t v. State ex rel West Va. Human Rights Comm’n, 309 S.E.2d 342 (W. Va. 1983).
85. See generally Quinnipiac Council, 528 A.2d 352.
86. See generally Dale, 734 A.2d 1196; Shepherdstown, 309 S.E.2d 342.
87. See generally Johnson v. Plasma All., No. C2-99-1261, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 502
(Minn. Ct. App. May 23, 2000).
88. See generally Quinnipiac Council, 528 A.2d 352.
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various roles from 1972–76.89 Nevertheless, when Pollard applied to be a
scoutmaster, she was refused because “the policy of the Boy Scouts of
America [says] that scoutmasters [must] be men at least 21 years of age.”90
Pollard appealed the lower court decision, arguing the court erred in
determining that the Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts, Inc. was not a place
of public accommodation.91
On appeal, the court analyzed both whether Quinnipiac Council, Boy
Scouts, Inc. was a place of public accommodation and whether failure to
allow a woman to serve as a Boy Scouts scoutmaster violated the
Connecticut public accommodation anti-discrimination statute.92 The
Connecticut public accommodation anti-discrimination statute provides
that it is discriminatory “[t]o deny any person within the jurisdiction of
this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public
accommodation.”93 The court looked into the legislative history of the
public accommodation anti-discrimination statute and found it doubtful
that the Legislature meant to require a physical site for an organization to
fit into the definition of a “place of public accommodation.”94 As a result,
the court determined that in Connecticut, coverage under the public
accommodation anti-discrimination statute does not require a physical
place as an essential element of the statute.95 Nevertheless, the court held
the public accommodation anti-discrimination statute did not encompass
a volunteer offering her own services.96
B.

Service Volunteers in West Virginia

West Virginia analyzed whether a service volunteer could bring a
claim under the public accommodation anti-discrimination statute in
Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire Department v. State ex rel West Virginia
Human Rights Commission.97 In Shepherdstown, the court consolidated
two separate cases where a fire department denied females the opportunity
to volunteer because of their sex.98 The Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire

89. Id. at 355.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64 (2015); Quinnipiac Council, 528 A.2d at 354.
93. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64(a) (2015).
94. Quinnipiac Council, 528 A.2d at 357.
95. Id. at 358.
96. Id. at 360; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64 (2015) (prohibiting denial of “full
and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation”).
97. See generally Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. State ex rel West Va. Human
Rights Comm’n, 309 S.E.2d 342 (W. Va. 1983). See also W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3 (2016); W.
VA. CODE § 5-11-9 (2016).
98. Shepherdstown, 309 S.E.2d at 344.
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Department denied membership to three female applicants without giving
an explanation or allowing for reconsideration.99 Similarly, the Berkeley
Springs Volunteer Fire Department’s constitution required members
(volunteer firefighters) be male, prompting the return of female
applicants’ applications without consideration.100 The Berkeley Springs
Volunteer Fire Department amended the constitution to remove the
restriction, but continued to deny applications of females for
membership.101
The court examined whether a service volunteer could bring a claim
under the West Virginia anti-discrimination statute by determining
whether a volunteer fire department is a place of public accommodation,
and therefore whether the exclusion of women from volunteering
constituted a violation of the statute.102 The West Virginia antidiscrimination statute encompasses both employment discrimination and
discrimination in a place of public accommodation.103 The statute makes
it an unlawful discriminatory act to “[r]efuse, withhold from or deny . . .
any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services
of [a] place of public accommodation[]” because of someone’s
membership in a protected class.104
Additionally, West Virginia statutes extensively regulate volunteer
fire departments.105 The court found a volunteer fire department is a place
of public accommodation because the fire department received some
public funding, thereby making it a quasi-governmental body, and
because the fire department provided a service to the public.106 As a result,

99. Id.
100. Id. at 346.
101. Id.
102. W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3 (2016); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9 (2016); Shepherdstown, 309
S.E.2d at 347–48.
103. W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9 (2016).
104. W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9(6)(A) (2016). See also Accommodation, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A convenience supplied by someone; esp., lodging and food.”);
Advantage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Any benefit or gain . . . .”); Facility,
MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2004) (“[S]omething that makes an
action, operation, or course of conduct easier . . . .”); Privilege, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2004) (“[A] right or benefit that is given to some people
and not to others.”); Service, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“[T]he performance
of some useful act or series of acts for the benefit of another, usu[ally] for a fee . . . an intangible
commodity in the form of human effort . . . .”).
105. Shepherdstown, 309 S.E.2d at 349. West Virginia statutes give power to
municipalities to allow for the formation of volunteer fire departments and to establish the
minimum and maximum number of people necessary to form a volunteer fire department, while
simultaneously making the volunteer fire department “subject to the authority of the governing
body.” Id. (citing W. VA. CODE §§ 8-15-1, -4 (2014)).
106. Id. at 351.
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volunteer fire departments are subject to West Virginia’s public
accommodation anti-discrimination statute with regard to volunteer
firefighters.107
C.

Service Volunteers in New Jersey

New Jersey analyzed whether a service volunteer could bring a claim
under the anti-discrimination statute in Dale v. Boy Scouts of America.108
Dale was an Assistant Scoutmaster with the Boy Scouts who realized he
was gay when he went to college.109 Dale was interviewed following his
attendance at a seminar about the psychological needs of gay and lesbian
teenagers, and shortly thereafter he received a letter, revoking his
membership and asking him to sever all ties with the Boy Scouts.110
According to the letter, Dale’s membership was revoked because the Boy
Scouts of America expressly prohibits lesbian and gay adults from being
members.111
To determine whether a service volunteer could bring a claim under
the anti-discrimination statute, the New Jersey Supreme Court examined
whether the Boy Scouts of America, an organization, could be considered
a place of public accommodation.112 The New Jersey anti-discrimination
statute encompasses both employment discrimination and discrimination
in a place of public accommodation, stating “[a]ll persons shall have the
opportunity . . . to obtain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities,
and privileges of any place of public accommodation” regardless of their
membership in a protected class.113 The court observed that the statute
must be interpreted liberally as the Legislature had directed.114
The court also recognized that for twenty-five years, a “place” has
not been restricted to a fixed location in New Jersey.115 The court
referenced an earlier case in which it found “[t]he statutory noun place . . .
is a term of convenience, not of limitation[,] . . . employed to reflect the
fact that public accommodations are commonly provided at fixed
places.”116 Additionally, the court addressed how the Legislature has done

107. Id. at 352.
108. See generally Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999) rev’d for First
Amendment concerns, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
109. Id. at 1204.
110. Id. at 1205.
111. Id. “[The] Boy Scouts claims that the language ‘morally straight’ and ‘clean’ in the
Oath and Law, respectively, constitutes a rejection of homosexuality.” Id. at 1202.
112. Id. at 1207–08.
113. N.J. STAT. ANN § 10:5-4 (West 2016).
114. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1208.
115. Id. at 1209.
116. Id. (quoting Nat’l Org. of Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 318 A.2d 33, 37
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nothing to limit the definition of “place.”117 As a result, the court
concluded the Boy Scouts organization is subject to the New Jersey law
against discrimination because it is a “place of public accommodation.”118
The court further concluded the revocation of Dale’s membership equated
to a denial of privileges and advantages, which therefore violated the antidiscrimination law.119
D.

Donor Volunteers in Minnesota

Minnesota determined whether a donor volunteer could bring a claim
alleging discrimination in a place of public accommodation in Johnson v.
Plasma Alliance.120 Johnson brought a claim under a Minneapolis
ordinance banning discrimination in a place of public accommodation in
the city on the basis of affectional preference.121 The claim arose when
Johnson attempted to donate plasma and Plasma Alliance asked whether
“he had had sex with another man since 1977.”122 Johnson said he had,
and as a result was not allowed to donate.123 Four years later, Johnson
discovered that he was a permanently-rejected donor as a result of the
incident.124
The analysis of whether Plasma Alliance violated the ordinance
proceeded as if Plasma Alliance were a place of public accommodation.125

(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974)).
117. Id at 1210.
118. Id. at 1230.
119. Id. The United States Supreme Court reversed this decision because requiring the
Boy Scouts to allow a homosexual scout leader violated the organization’s First Amendment
rights. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000). The United States Supreme Court
did not find the New Jersey Supreme Court was incorrect in determining the Boy Scouts is a
place of public accommodation under New Jersey law. Id.
120. See generally Johnson v. Plasma All., No. C2-99-1261, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS
502 (Ct. App. May 23, 2000).
121. Id. at *2. “Affectional preference is defined as ‘having or manifesting an emotional
or physical attachment to another consenting person or persons, or having or manifesting a
preference for such attachment, or having or projecting a self-image not associated with one’s
biological maleness or one’s biological femaleness.’” Id. at *4 (quoting MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.,
CODE OF ORDINANCES, Title 7, § 139.20 (1990)). The Minneapolis ordinance has since been
updated to replace instances of “affectional preference” with “sexual orientation.”
MINNEAPOLIS MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES, Title 7, § 139 (2006),
http://www.minneapolismn.gov/www/groups/public/@council/
documents/webcontent/convert_278654.pdf [https://perma.cc/KL3K-F529].
122. Johnson, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 502 at *1–2.
123. Id. at *2.
124. Id.
125. See generally id.; cf. Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-325, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166360, at *11–12, *18 (D. Utah Dec. 1, 2014) (holding a plasma donation
center is not a place of public accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act as the
plasma donation center pays the donor for the plasma and then sells the plasma for a profit).
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The court held that Plasma Alliance did not violate the ordinance, but did
not address whether Plasma Alliance was a place of public
accommodation.126 Ultimately, the court found Johnson was not actually
discriminated against by Plasma Alliance, drawing upon a now repudiated
distinction between Johnson not being allowed to donate because of his
status (affectional preference) and his conduct (because he had sex with
another man).127
E.

The Approaches of Other States Regarding Discrimination Claims
of Volunteers under Public Accommodation Anti-Discrimination
Statutes are Inadequate in Massachusetts

Massachusetts has consistently pioneered the promulgation of laws
prohibiting discrimination.128 Massachusetts was the first state in the
country to legalize same-sex marriage,129 and was the second state in the
nation to implement a comprehensive anti-discrimination law protecting
individuals from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in
housing, public accommodations, employment, credit, and services.130
Additionally, Massachusetts has implemented legislation to protect
transgender people from discrimination.131 The Equal Rights Amendment

126. Johnson, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 502, at *12.
127. Id. at *11. In Lawrence v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court overturned a
statute criminalizing sodomy, because making the conduct criminal punishes the status.
Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003). The Court held that “[w]hen homosexual conduct
is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject
homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.” Id. at 575.
Justice O’Connor expounds on this idea, stating “[w]hile it is true the law applies only to
conduct, the conduct targeted by this law is conduct that is closely correlated with being
homosexual. . . . Texas’ sodomy law is targeted at more than conduct. It is instead directed
toward gay persons as a class.” Id. at 583 (O’Connor, J. concurring).
128.
History of the MCAD, MASS.GOV, http://www mass.gov/mcad/about/mcadhistory html [https://perma.cc/84DD-CFYT]. In 1944, the governor of Massachusetts
implemented a committee to combat discrimination, which later became the Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination. Id. Massachusetts laws prohibiting discrimination in
employment and in places of public accommodation offer protections from discrimination on
account of sex, sexual orientation, disability, national origin, race, color, and religious creed.
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (2016).
129. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003). “Limiting
the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage to opposite-sex couples violates the
basic premises of individual liberty and equality under the law protected by the Massachusetts
Constitution.” Id.
130. Anti-Discrimination Law in Massachusetts, GLAD (Feb. 11, 2014), https://
www.glad.org/rights/massachusetts/c/anti-discrimination-law-in-massachusetts
[https://
perma.cc/29XD-Y5S6].
131. Id.; see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 22C, § 32 (2016) (stating that a “threatened,
attempted or completed overt act motivated at least in part by . . . gender identity” constituted a
hate crime). The First Circuit Court of Appeals has also held that it is possible to assert a theory
of sex discrimination based on being treated disparately for not conforming to gender norms.
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to the Massachusetts Constitution provides that cases of sex
discrimination will be examined under strict scrutiny. 132 Accordingly,
providing enhanced protections against discrimination to volunteers in
Massachusetts is consistent with the State’s historical views and stances
regarding discrimination.133
The methods other states use with regard to volunteers’
discrimination claims are inadequate solutions in Massachusetts.134 The
state that has refused to allow a volunteer to bring a discrimination claim
under public accommodation anti-discrimination law—Connecticut—
would provide an ineffective solution for Massachusetts to follow as this
approach provides no additional protections to volunteers.135 The states
that have allowed volunteers to allege claims of discrimination in a place
of public accommodation—Minnesota, New Jersey, and West Virginia—
could serve as a starting point for Massachusetts.136 Nevertheless,
Massachusetts would need to expand beyond the scope of protection given
to volunteers in these other states as each state only addresses either
service volunteers or donor volunteers; Massachusetts should implement
a protection for all types of volunteers.137 However, the limited scope of
these other states could simply be the product of the limited number of
cases in which volunteers allege discrimination in a place of public
accommodation.138
Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215 (1st Cir. 2000).
132. Lorianne Sainsbury-Wong, Benjamin Wilson & Alyssa Vangeli, The Useful but
Overlooked Massachusetts Equal Rights Amendment, MASSBAR (Aug. 2011),
http://www.massbar.org/publications/lawyers-journal/2011/august/the-useful-but-overlookedmassachusetts-equal-rights-amendment [https://perma.cc/4MG2-F6LB].
133. See History of the MCAD, supra note 128.
134. See generally Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts, Inc. v. Comm’n on Human Rights
& Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352 (Conn. 1987); Johnson v. Plasma All., No. C2-99-1261, 2000
Minn. App. LEXIS 502 (Ct. App. May 23, 2000); Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196
(N.J. 1999) rev’d for First Amendment concerns, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Shepherdstown
Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. State ex rel West Va. Human Rights Comm’n, 309 S.E.2d 342 (W. Va.
1983).
135. See generally Quinnipiac Council, 528 A.2d 352.
136. See generally Johnson, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 502 (allowing a donor volunteer
to bring a claim alleging discrimination in a place of public accommodation); Dale, 734 A.2d
1196 (allowing a service volunteer to bring a claim alleging discrimination in a place of public
accommodation); Shepherdstown, 309 S.E.2d 342 (allowing service volunteers to bring a claim
alleging discrimination in a place of public accommodation).
137. See generally Johnson, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 502 (allowing a donor volunteer
to bring a claim alleging discrimination in a place of public accommodation); Dale, 734 A.2d
1196 (allowing a service volunteer to bring a claim alleging discrimination in a place of public
accommodation); Shepherdstown, 309 S.E.2d 342 (allowing service volunteers to bring a claim
alleging discrimination in a place of public accommodation).
138. See generally Quinnipiac Council, 528 A.2d 352 (holding that Connecticut’s public
accommodation anti-discrimination statute does not cover someone offering her own services);
Johnson, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 502 (analyzing whether a plasma donation center
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State Views on Discrimination with Regard to Interns

It is worthwhile to note that six states and the District of Columbia
have recently amended statutes to reflect protections for a specific type of
service volunteers: interns.139 Connecticut is the most recent state to
provide protections for unpaid interns against discrimination and sexual
harassment,140 joining California,141 Maryland,142 New York,143
Oregon,144 Illinois,145 and the District of Columbia.146 Whereas the
protections for unpaid interns are beneficial, the scope of these protections
is unfortunately very limited because they only apply to a small class of
service volunteers.147 Additionally, the Connecticut statute offers
protections to interns specifically in the context of employment-like
relationships where someone is working with the intention of gaining
training and experience.148 Furthermore, these protections do not address
whether an intern or any other type of volunteer can bring a claim under
public accommodation anti-discrimination law.149 If Massachusetts
implemented statutory protection for unpaid interns akin to Connecticut,
only a specific class of service volunteers would receive protections.150
Massachusetts legislators must also be cognizant of the hurdle presented
by Comey v. Hill, which requires explicit notice of legislative intent to

discriminated against a donor under a public accommodation anti-discrimination ordinance);
Dale, 734 A.2d 1196 (holding that an openly homosexual male not allowed to be a scout leader
can bring a claim under public accommodation anti-discrimination law; Shepherdstown, 309
S.E.2d 342 (holding that a volunteer fire department refusing to allow a female volunteer
violated the public accommodation anti-discrimination statute).
139. Samantha Lachman, A Shocking Number of States Don’t Protect Unpaid Interns
from Discrimination and Sexual Harassment, HUFF. POST (May 27, 2015, 4:17 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/27/unpaid-interns-harassment_n_7453826.
html
[https://perma.cc/HDJ6-HBTK].
140. 2015 Conn. Acts 56 (2015).
141. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940 (Deering 2016) (protecting unpaid interns from
discrimination and sexual harassment).
142. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-610 (LexisNexis 2016) (protecting unpaid
interns from discrimination).
143. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296-c (LexisNexis 2016) (protecting unpaid interns from
discrimination and sexual harassment).
144. OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.350 (2015) (protecting unpaid interns from discrimination
and sexual harassment).
145. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101 (2014) (protecting unpaid interns from sexual
harassment).
146. D.C. CODE §§ 2-1401.02, 2-1401.11 (2016) (protecting unpaid interns from
discrimination and sexual harassment).
147. See, e.g., 2015 Conn. Acts 56 (2015). “‘Intern’ means an individual who performs
work for an employer for the purpose of training . . . .” Id.
148. See, e.g., id.
149. See, e.g., id.
150. See id.
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employer-employee

III. MASSACHUSETTS SHOULD ALLOW ALL VOLUNTEERS WHO FACE
DISCRIMINATION TO BRING CLAIMS UNDER THE PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATION ANTI-DISCRIMINATION STATUTE
Currently, if a volunteer is discriminated against based on
membership or perceived membership in a protected class, the volunteer
has limited remedies in Massachusetts courts.152 Volunteers are currently
limited to claims brought under common law or under the Massachusetts
civil rights statute.153 All volunteers should have greater statutory
protections against discrimination because the current anti-discrimination
statutes, as they apply to volunteers, do not provide sufficient
protection.154 The Massachusetts civil rights statute only prevents
constitutional rights from being interfered with by use of or attempted use
of threats, intimidation, or coercion.155 Under the Massachusetts civil
rights statute, if a volunteer is turned away or mistreated because of
membership or perceived membership in a protected class, the volunteer
would have no statutory claim because turning someone away does not
involve threats, intimidation, or coercion per se.156
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has previously analyzed
what constitutes an employer-employee relationship, implying that a
volunteer cannot bring a claim under employment anti-discrimination law;
the Legislature has not responded to this analysis.157 However,
Massachusetts has not addressed whether a volunteer can bring a claim
under public accommodation anti-discrimination laws.158 In determining
whether a volunteer can bring a claim of discrimination under the
Massachusetts public accommodation anti-discrimination statute, there
are two questions that must be answered.159 First, is the recipient of the

151. See Comey v. Hill, 438 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Mass. 1982).
152. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, §§ 11H–I (2016); Lowery v. Klemm, 845 N.E.2d
1124, 1130–31 (Mass. 2006).
153. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, §§ 11H–I (2016); Lowery v. Klemm, 845 N.E.2d
1124, 1130–31 (Mass. 2006).
154. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, §§ 11H–I (2016).
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. See Comey v. Hill, 438 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Mass. 1982) (regarding the scope of the
Massachusetts employment anti-discrimination laws: “In the absence of any indication to the
contrary, we will not assume that the Legislature intended to cover relationships outside the
traditional common law employer-employee relationship.”).
158. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (2016).
159. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (2016).
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volunteer efforts a place of public accommodation?160 Second, does the
denial of the ability to volunteer amount to a denial of accommodations,
advantages, facilities, or privileges?161 If the answer to both of these
questions is yes, then Massachusetts should allow a volunteer to bring
discrimination claims under the public accommodation antidiscrimination statutes.162
A.

Places of Public Accommodation

When a court determines the meaning of words in a statute, unless
the word is a technical term, it “shall be construed according to the
common and approved usage of the language . . . .”163 The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court interpreted the meaning of “place” in the context
of “place of public accommodation” in U.S. Jaycees v. Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination.164
The court in U.S. Jaycees considered whether an organization, U.S.
Jaycees, would be considered a place of public accommodation for
purposes of Massachusetts public accommodation anti-discrimination
laws.165 The question arose when women were denied admission into the
organization, and they alleged the denial of admission amounted to sex
discrimination under the public accommodation anti-discrimination
law.166 U.S. Jaycees limited membership to men aged eighteen to thirtyfive, which was supported by the organization’s by-laws.167
The court analyzed various definitions of “place” and determined
that on its face, the Massachusetts public accommodation antidiscrimination law does not apply to membership organizations since they
do not fall within the accepted definitions of “place.”168 The first criterion

160.
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (2016). “A place of public
accommodation . . . shall be deemed to include any place, whether licensed or unlicensed, which
is open to and accepts or solicits the patronage of the general public . . . .” Id. The
Commonwealth provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of places of public accommodation.
Id.
161. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (2016). “All persons shall have the right to
the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any place of public
accommodation . . . .” Id.
162. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (2016).
163. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, § 6 (2016).
164. See generally U.S. Jaycees v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 463 N.E.2d
1151 (Mass. 1984).
165. Id. at 1152.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1154. The by-laws stated that the purpose of U.S. Jaycees is to “promote and
foster the growth and development of young men’s civic organizations in the United
States . . . .” Id. at 1153.
168. Id. at 1156.
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that must be met in determining whether something is a place of public
accommodation is that it must be an actual physical place.169 The court
noted that U.S. Jaycees does not maintain a “physical ‘place’ of operations
in Massachusetts.”170 Because U.S. Jaycees did not have a primary place
of operations in Massachusetts and an organization itself cannot be a place
of public accommodation, the court concluded that U.S. Jaycees was not
a place of public accommodation with regard to the public
accommodation anti-discrimination laws.171
However, the court
recognized that it was still possible for the organization to discriminate in
a place of public accommodation.172 For instance, if an organization,
while in a place of public accommodation, does not allow a person to
participate because of his or her membership in a protected class, the
organization’s actions may be considered discriminatory under the public
accommodation anti-discrimination statute.173
Applying the court’s analysis in U.S. Jaycees, whether a volunteer
can allege discrimination in a place of public accommodation will depend
on whether a business or organization has a primary place of operations
in Massachusetts that receives the volunteer efforts.174 If a person
volunteers—as either a service or donor volunteer—for a business or
organization that has a primary physical place of operations in
Massachusetts, then the recipient of the volunteer efforts would be
considered a “place” and may fall within the scope of public
accommodation anti-discrimination law.175 Importantly, however, even if
the person or organization does not have a primary place of operations in
Massachusetts, the recipient of the volunteer efforts may still be
considered a “place” for purposes of the public accommodation antidiscrimination law if the location of the alleged discriminatory act falls
within the definition of “place” with regard to the statute.176

169. Id. at 1157.
170. Id. at 1156. The court held that Massachusetts Jaycees, which maintains a place of
operation in Massachusetts, could be considered a place of public accommodation. Id. at 1160.
Cf. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1209 (N.J. 1999) (stating that for twenty-five
years, a “place” has not been restricted to a fixed location in New Jersey), rev’d for First
Amendment concerns, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
171. U.S. Jaycees, 463 N.E.2d at 1160.
172. Id. at 1157.
173. See id. at 1159–60. Accordingly, “neither the U.S. Jaycees nor the Massachusetts
Jaycees may discriminate against women in the admission to, or treatment on, the property of
Massachusetts Jaycees.” Id. at 1160.
174. See generally id.
175. See, e.g., id. at 1160 (holding an organization that does not have a primary place of
operation in Massachusetts is not a place of public accommodation for purposes of the public
accommodation antidiscrimination statute).
176. See id. at 1159–60.

2017]

PROTECTING VOLUNTEERS IN MASSACHUSETTS

199

After determining whether a business or organization is a place, it is
necessary to determine whether that place would be considered a place of
public accommodation.177 A “public accommodation” is defined as “[a]
business that provides lodging, food, entertainment, or other services to
the public . . . .”178 The Massachusetts public accommodation antidiscrimination statute greatly increases the scope of the term “place of
public accommodation” with “the inclusion of the words ‘any place . . .
which is open to and accepts or solicits the patronage of the general
public.’”179 Whereas the Massachusetts public accommodation antidiscrimination statute enumerates examples of places of public
accommodation, the broad legislative purpose for the statute indicates the
list is not exhaustive and should not restrict application of the term “place
of public accommodation.”180
In the broadest application, a business or organization could be a
place of public accommodation and could be liable to anyone under the
public accommodation anti-discrimination statute so long as the business
or organization solicits the patronage of someone in the general public.181
However, in a narrower scope, claims under the public accommodation
anti-discrimination statute could be limited to only those specific
individuals from whom the place of public accommodation solicits
patronage.182 “Patronage” is defined as “[t]he giving of support,
sponsorship, or protection.”183 Financial support of a business from
clients or customers would fit into this definition of patronage;
additionally, support in the form of volunteer efforts could also fit into this
definition.184
Whereas the broadest application of the Massachusetts public
accommodation anti-discrimination statute would apply to volunteers as
well as anyone else, there is also a way in which the more narrow
application would apply to volunteers.185 A common method of obtaining
the help of volunteers is through recruitment.186 Recruitment of
177. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (2016).
178. Public Accommodation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (found as a
sub-definition of accommodation).
179. Local Fin. Co. of Rockland v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimin., 242 N.E.2d 536,
538 (Mass. 1968) (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A).
180. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (2016); Local Fin. Co. of Rockland, 242 N.E2d
at 538.
181. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (2016); see also Ryan H. Nelson, An Indirect
Challenge to the FDA’s “Gay Blood Ban”, 23 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 1, 12 (2014).
182. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (2016).
183. Patronage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
184. See id.
185. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (2016).
186.
See Jenette Nagy, Recruiting Volunteers, COMMUNITY TOOL BOX,
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volunteers is a type of solicitation, and consequently, solicitation of the
volunteer’s support, or patronage.187 Therefore, if a business or
organization attempts to recruit volunteers or publicly advertises the
availability of volunteer opportunities, even the narrow view of what is
encompassed by the term “place of public accommodation” would allow
a volunteer to bring a claim under the Massachusetts public
accommodation anti-discrimination statute should the business or
organization violate the statute.188
B.

Denial of the Ability to Volunteer Based on Membership or
Perceived Membership in a Protected Class Equates to a Violation
of the Massachusetts Public Accommodation Anti-Discrimination
Statute

In determining whether a place of public accommodation has
violated the Massachusetts public accommodation anti-discrimination
statute by turning away a volunteer, it is necessary to examine whether the
volunteer was denied the “accommodations, advantages, facilities, [or]
privileges of [the] place of public accommodation” because of his
membership in a protected class.189 Whereas volunteers typically do not
receive remuneration, they often offer their services in order to receive
something non-monetary in return.190 The benefits a volunteer receives
depend on the individual volunteer and the type of volunteer work.191
Although some benefits are consistent regardless of the type of
volunteer,192 more often benefits vary depending on whether the volunteer
is a service volunteer193 or a donor volunteer.194 The next step, therefore,
is to examine the various benefits a volunteer receives and to determine
whether these benefits could be considered accommodations, advantages,

http://ctb.ku.edu/en/table-of-contents/structure/volunteers/recruiting/main
[https://
perma.cc/8AJE-CPYL].
187. See Solicitation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The act or an
instance of requesting or seeking to obtain something; a request or petition . . . .”).
188. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (2016).
189. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (2016).
190. Nagy, supra note 186.
191. See WALTER P. PIDGEON, JR., THE UNIVERSAL BENEFITS OF VOLUNTEERING 37–
38 (1998).
192. See, e.g., CHARLES A. BENNETT, VOLUNTEERING: THE SELFISH BENEFITS 29
(2001). “Selfless people are good people . . . . They’re in it for the image, a quick ‘feel good.’”
Id. at 29.
193. See, e.g., Horoszowski, 5 Surprising Benefits, supra note 13.
194. See, e.g., Feigenbaum, supra note 13; Rachel Swalin, 4 Unexpected Benefits of
Donating Blood, HEALTH (June 13, 2014), http://news health.com/2014/06/13/4-unexpectedbenefits-of-donating-blood/ [https://perma.cc/WSM9-R8FS].
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facilities, or privileges.195
For purposes of this Note, a service volunteer is someone who offers
his services without expectation of remuneration.196 Service volunteers
can take various forms; the most common examples of service volunteers,
however, are what many consider to be traditional volunteers—people
who give their time to activities, such as reading to children in an
orphanage—and interns—people who give their services with the goal of
increasing professional experience.197 A donor volunteer is someone who
makes donations.198 Donor volunteers give tangible goods such as blood
or money.199 Volunteers gain various types of benefits—physical, mental,
social, professional, and economic—as a result of their volunteer
efforts.200 Benefits may apply to volunteers as a general class or to one
specific type of volunteer.201 For example, studies have shown that those
who volunteer receive more health benefits than the recipients of the
volunteer efforts.202
1.

Benefits for Service Volunteers

Research shows a significant relationship between improved
physical health and volunteering.203 Those who volunteer tend to have
lower mortality rates than those who do not volunteer.204 Additionally,
studies have shown that service volunteers have increased functional
ability.205 Some volunteers may even report experiencing a “helper’s
high . . . an actual physical sensation that occurs when people help others

195. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (2016).
196. See Service, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Labor performed in the
interest . . . of others.”); Volunteer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Someone
who gratuitously and freely confers a benefit on another[.]”).
197. See 5 Different Types of Volunteering Activities, VOLUNTEER WKLY. (Nov. 30,
2012),
http://www.volunteerweekly.org/types-of-volunteering-activities/
[https://perma.cc/Z6R5-QH9F ] [hereinafter 5 Different Types].
198. See Donor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Someone who gives
something without receiving consideration for the transfer.”); Volunteer, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
199.
See, e.g., Ways to Donate, AM. RED CROSS, http://www.redcross.org/
donations/ways-to-donate [https://perma.cc/XL6P-ZFFV]; Ways to Give, FEEDING AM.,
http://www.feedingamerica.org/ways-to-give/ [https://perma.cc/2QYJ-FVQA].
200. See ROBERT GRIMM JR. ET AL., OFFICE OF RESEARCH & POLICY DEV., CORP. FOR
NAT’L & CMTY. SERV., THE HEALTH BENEFITS OF VOLUNTEERING: A REVIEW OF RECENT
RESEARCH 1 (2007); 5 Different Types, supra note 197; Feigenbaum, supra note 13.
201. See generally, e.g., GRIMM JR. ET AL., supra note 200; Horoszowski, 5 Surprising
Benefits, supra note 13; Feigenbaum, supra note 13.
202. GRIMM JR. ET AL., supra note 200, at 3.
203. Id. at 1.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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that makes them experience greater energy and strength . . . .”206
Additionally, volunteers experience increased mental health and
social benefits.207 Volunteers who freely give their time feel they have
more free time.208 “[T]he feeling of having more time” tends to lead to
lower stress levels.209 Volunteering has also been shown to lead to
reduced depression later in the volunteer’s life.210 Volunteers feel socially
connected, experience increased levels of self-esteem and happiness, and
enjoy improved psychological well-being.211 Volunteers also feel more
loved.212 “Volunteering builds empathy, strengthens social bonds and
makes you smile—all factors that increase the feeling of love.”213
Additionally, service volunteers build more bonds with fellow volunteers
and with organizers, thereby leading to an increased sense of belonging.214
Furthermore, people who volunteer develop new skills.215 When
service volunteers partake in skill-based volunteer work such as
internships, they gain additional professional benefits.216 Volunteering
can also lead to career gains.217 Internships provide opportunities to
network and to connect with mentors in a specific field of business.218
Additionally, internships allow the volunteer to gain new skills and “real
world” experience.219 An internship provides an opportunity for the
volunteer to explore career options and ensure the career path is correct

206. Rita Altman, The Benefits of Volunteering, HUFF. POST (Aug. 5, 2013, 6:06 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rita-altman-rn/the-benefits-of-volunteer_b_3377383 html
[https://perma.cc/CB3E-2G6X].
207. GRIMM JR. ET AL., supra note 200, at 1.
208. See Horoszowski, 5 Surprising Benefits, supra note 13.
209. Mark Horoszowski, Volunteering Makes You Happier—Here’s Why, MOVING
WORLDS (Feb. 12, 2014), http://blog movingworlds.org/volunteering-makes-you-happier/
[https://perma.cc/P526-S7J5] [hereinafter Horoszowski, Volunteering Makes You Happier].
210. GRIMM JR. ET AL., supra note 200, at 1.
211. Phillip Moeller, Why Helping Others Makes Us Happy, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 4, 2012,
9:20
AM),
http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/articles/2012/04/04/whyhelping-others-makes-us-happy.
212. Horoszowski, 5 Surprising Benefits, supra note 13.
213. Id.
214. Horoszowski, Volunteering Makes You Happier, supra note 209.
215. Horoszowski, 5 Surprising Benefits, supra note 13.
216. See Heather Huhman, Why You Should Get a Summer Internship, U.S. NEWS (Apr.
29,
2011,
9:00
AM),
http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/outside-voicescareers/2011/04/29/why-you-should-get-a-summer-internship [https://perma.cc/Q825-EXM3].
217. Dawn C. Carr, 5 Reasons Why You Should Volunteer, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Mar. 12,
2014),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-third-age/201403/5-reasons-why-youshould-volunteer [https://perma.cc/TDG8-FWPP].
218. Beth Braccio Hering, Why Are Internships So Important?, CNN (Apr. 14, 2010,
11:09 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/LIVING/worklife/04/14/cb.why.internships.important/
[https://perma.cc/GNQ2-AW4R].
219. Id.
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for the volunteer.220 If it is, an internship could put the volunteer in a
position where he has an advantage for future employment
opportunities.221 If the internship does not lead to employment, the service
volunteer has nevertheless strengthened his resume and made connections
for future employment references elsewhere.222
2.

Benefits for Donor Volunteers

There are certain types of benefits specific to donor volunteers.223
Federal law allows a deduction on federal taxes for charitable
contributions.224 This tax benefit could serve as a motivation for many
who make donations.225 However, donor volunteers seeking a tax
deduction are not limited to contributing monetary donations.226 A donor
volunteer can receive tax deductions by donating used clothing to thrift
shops and reporting the value of the donated goods to the Internal Revenue
Service.227 A donor volunteer is also entitled to a tax deduction for the
fair market value of donated food and household goods.228 Additionally,
when a donor volunteer donates an automobile to an IRS-qualified
organization, the donor volunteer can claim a tax deduction up to the fair
market value of the car.229
There are also additional benefits when a donor volunteer gives
biological material, such as blood.230 Blood donors experience health
benefits including increased blood flow.231 While there is no confirmed
correlation between the increased blood flow and long lasting health
benefits, studies have shown that people who donate blood are
hospitalized less often.232 Additionally, blood donors receive the
equivalent of a “mini check-up” when they donate blood, as blood donors
220. Huhman, supra note 216.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See, e.g., Feigenbaum, supra note 13.
224. 26 U.S.C. § 170(a)(1) (2014).
225. See Feigenbaum, supra note 13.
226. See, e.g., Ron Lieber, Tax-Deductible Clothing Donations Are Great, Except Your
Used Socks, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2015), http:// www nytimes.com/2015/05/16/yourmoney/tax-deductible-clothing-donations-are-great-except-your-used-socks html?_r=1
[https://perma.cc/PAM4-2DCB]; Can I Get Tax Deductions for Charitable Contributions,
EFILE.COM,
http://www.efile.com/tax-deduction/income-deduction/charitable-contributions/
[https://perma.cc/KC3C-KS9U] [hereinafter Can I Get Tax Deductions].
227. Lieber, supra note 226.
228. Can I Get Tax Deductions, supra note 226.
229. TAX EXEMPT AND GOV’T ENTITIES DIV., IRS, A DONOR’S GUIDE TO CAR
DONATION 3, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/pub4303.pdf [https://perma.cc/PY4M-NDMP].
230. See, e.g., Swalin, supra note 194.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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are required to have their temperature, blood pressure, pulse, and
hemoglobin levels checked prior to donating.233 Donated blood is also
screened for sexually transmitted infections and other infectious
diseases.234 Additionally, blood donation helps to regulate iron levels in
the body.235 Donating blood removes iron from the body and statistics
show that decreasing the amount of iron in a healthy person’s body is
beneficial to the person’s health.236 By donating blood, the blood donor
also reduces his general risk of certain types of heart disease.237
3.

The Denial of Benefits Volunteers Receive Amounts to a
Denial of Privileges and Advantages

Regardless of the types of volunteer efforts, volunteering provides
various benefits to the volunteer.238 Many organizations promote these
benefits in an effort to recruit volunteers.239 The pivotal question is
233. Id.
234. Id. Similarly, sperm donors receive benefits such as STD testing, physical exams,
and genetic testing. See Benefits of Becoming a Donor, SPERM BANK OF CAL.,
https://www.thespermbankofca.org/content/benefits-and-compensation
[https://
perma.cc/Q3L5-32AX].
235. Swalin, supra note 194.
236. Id.
237. Health Benefits of Donating Blood, ONE BLOOD, https://www.oneblood.org/aboutdonating/blood-donor-basics/can-i-donate/health-benefits.stml
[https://perma.cc/9TSNXCCL]. Similar to blood donation, a person can also donate plasma, which typically entails
receipt of some form of monetary compensation. See, e.g., Plasma Donation FAQs,
OCTAPHARMA
PLASMA,
http://octapharmaplasma.com/donor/plasma-donation-faq
[https://perma.cc/72YV-YFFR]. It is arguable whether the donation of plasma is a volunteer
effort because of the receipt of monetary compensation. See id. See also Remuneration,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Some plasma donation centers emphasize that the
compensation is in exchange for the time spent donating plasma, not the plasma itself. See, e.g.,
Plasma Donation FAQs, supra note 237. Thus, this compensation could be viewed as
remuneration. See Remuneration, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Therefore,
instead of being considered a volunteer, the donor may be viewed as an independent contractor
entrusted with the task of giving plasma. See Independent Contractor, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Whereas the plasma donor would not fit neatly into the definition
of independent contractor, the receipt of remuneration in exchange for the time spent donating
plasma raises the question of whether the donor could be considered an independent contractor.
See id. However, if the compensation is in exchange for the time spent donating, it would not
counter an argument that the plasma donor is a donor volunteer. See, e.g., Plasma Donation
FAQs, supra note 237. Regardless, the plasma donor will receive benefits that apply to
volunteers in general, such as improved psychological and mental well-being. See
Horoszowski, Volunteering Makes You Happier, supra note 209.
238. See GRIMM JR. ET AL., supra note 200, at 1; 5 Different Types supra note 197;
Feigenbaum, supra note 13.
239. See, e.g., Benefits of Volunteering, ASUG, https://www.asug.com/
volunteers/benefits-of-volunteering [https://perma.cc/PR5R-PVXT]; Benefits of Volunteering,
BIG
BROTHERS
BIG
SISTERS
MASS.
BAY,
http://www.bbbsmb.org/
site/c.9gKMJZMxF7LUG/b.8724893/k.5791/Benefits_of_Volunteering htm
[https://
perma.cc/57HL-ZLFC];
Why
Donate
Blood?,
AM.
RED
CROSS,
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whether denial of these benefits based on the volunteer’s membership in
a protected class would amount to a denial of “accommodations,
advantages, facilities [or] privileges” for purposes of the Massachusetts
public accommodation anti-discrimination statute.240 To answer this
question, it is necessary to understand the definitions of each of these
words. An “accommodation” is “[a] convenience supplied by someone;
esp[ecially], lodging and food.”241 An “advantage” is “[a]ny benefit or
gain.”242 A “facility” is “something that makes an action, operation, or
course of conduct easier.”243 A “privilege” is “a right . . . granted as a
peculiar benefit, advantage, or favor.”244 These definitions are important
because Massachusetts law labels “the right to the full and equal
accommodations, advantage, facilities and privileges of any place of
public accommodation” as a civil right.245
Ryan H. Nelson addressed this question in his article An Indirect
Challenge to the FDA’s “Gay Blood Ban,”246 albeit within the narrow
scope of a man who has had sex with another man being banned from
donating blood.247 Focusing on the benefits a blood donor receives, such
as a “mini physical,” Nelson stated that because denying a person the

http://www.redcrossblood.org/donating-blood/why-donate-blood
[https://perma.cc/ZMR522TD]; 4 Personal Benefits of Volunteering in Your Community, UNITED WAY (Oct. 2, 2012),
http://www.unitedway.org/blog/4-personal-benefits-of-volunteering-in-your-community
[https://perma.cc/XN3Z-A3KJ].
240. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (2016). The statute itself does not define these
terms. See id.
241. Accommodation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
242. Advantage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
243. Facility, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2004).
244. Privilege, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2004).
245. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (2016).
246. Nelson, supra note 181.
247. Id. at 4. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration recently changed its policy
regarding the indefinite ban on men who have had sex with men being able to donate blood.
FDA Updates Blood Donor Deferral Policy to Reflect the Most Current Scientific Evidence and
Continue to Ensure the Safety of the U.S. Blood Supply, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 21,
2015),
http://www fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm478031 htm
[https://perma.cc/SK2X-88L3]. The updated policy only bans men who have sex with men
from donating blood for a twelve-month period after they have had sex with another man. Id.
The June 2016 mass shooting at Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida, revitalized the debate over
the FDA’s ban disallowing men who have had sex with men from donating blood. See Donald
G. McNeil, Jr., Orlando Shooting Renews Debate Over Limits on Gay Men Donating Blood,
N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2016), http://www nytimes.com/2016/06/16/health/orlando-shootingrenews-debate-over-limits-on-gay-men-donating-blood html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/KDJ76X7P]. Prompted in part by the fact that Pulse was a gay nightclub, gay men under the
impression that restrictions had been relaxed prepared to donate blood and help victims, yet
were turned away because the FDA’s restrictions remained intact. Id. See Lizette Alvarez &
Richard Pérez Peña, Orlando Gunman Attacks Gay Nightclub, Leaving 50 Dead, N.Y. TIMES
(June 12, 2016), http://www nytimes.com/2016/06/13/us/orlando-nightclub-shooting html.
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ability to donate blood denies the person the perks associated with the
blood donation, it equates to a denial of advantages and privileges.248 It is
less likely the denial of these benefits would amount to a denial of
accommodations or facilities.249
Nelson’s argument could be expanded to all volunteers.250
Volunteers receive a multitude of benefits for their efforts.251 If a person
is denied the ability to volunteer, the person will be denied the benefits he
otherwise would have received.252 Additionally, based on the definition
of “advantage” as “[a]ny benefit or gain . . . ,” it reasonably follows that
the denial of these benefits would also amount to a denial of advantages.253
Similarly, with “privilege” being defined as “a right or benefit that is given
to some people and not to others,” it is a reasonable inference that the
denial of benefits would equate to a denial of privileges.254 Therefore, if
a business or organization with a principal place of operations in
Massachusetts solicits volunteers and denies someone the opportunity to
volunteer based on his membership in a protected class, then the business
or organization would likely be violating the Massachusetts public
accommodation anti-discrimination statute.255 Massachusetts should thus
allow a volunteer to bring a discrimination claim under the public
accommodation anti-discrimination law.256
C.

Public Policy Supports Granting Volunteers the Ability to Bring
Discrimination Claims under the Massachusetts Public
Accommodation Anti-Discrimination Statute

Maintaining a strong volunteer workforce is integral to the success
of many businesses, especially mission-driven workforces.257
Organizations that aim to improve society, “places like museums, social
service organizations, and faith-based organizations[,]” typically depend
on unpaid volunteers to help accomplish their goals.258 Volunteers help
keep our cities and towns clean, mentor and teach society’s youth, and
educate the public; this is just a small sampling of what volunteers do to

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Nelson, supra note 181, at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
See id.
See supra Sections III.B.1, III.B.2.
See supra Sections III.B.1, III.B.2.
See Advantage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
See Privilege, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2004).
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (2016).
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (2016).
Carr, supra note 217.
Id.
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help society.259 Volunteers are critical to helping society function.260
Examining what would happen if there were no volunteers brings
into relief the importance of volunteers in society.261 “[I]magine if one
day, all volunteers simply didn’t show up . . . . What basic needs would
go unmet? What opportunities to grow, learn, and thrive as a society
would be lost?”262 Massachusetts has experienced volunteer shortages
first-hand.263 One example of an organization that suffers from a lack of
volunteers is the Massachusetts Chapter of the American Red Cross,
which solicited for donations of blood and platelets to counteract a
seasonal shortage in 2015.264 Another example is the Girl Scouts, which
has numerous girls annually who are placed on a waitlist due to lack of
adult volunteers.265
A shortage of volunteers has detrimental impacts on society.266 Why
then should it be acceptable to discriminate against a volunteer and reject
his offerings of volunteer efforts solely because of his membership or
perceived membership in a protected class? Prohibiting discrimination of
volunteers will benefit society by helping to prevent a further decrease in
volunteers that would result from the discrimination.267 For public policy
reasons, it is in the best interest of the Commonwealth to allow volunteers
to bring discrimination claims under the Massachusetts public
accommodation anti-discrimination statute.268
259.
Why is Volunteering Important?, IDEALIST, http://www.idealist.org/info/
Volunteer/Why [https://perma.cc/NZ7D-KCFT]. Idealist is part of the non-profit organization
Action Without Borders, and is intended to connect people with non-profit organizations in
order to do more with what we have. See A Brief History of Idealist, IDEALIST,
http://www.idealist.org/info/About/History [https://perma.cc/C7XX-74BK].
See also
Volunteer
Resource
Center,
IDEALIST,
http://www.idealist.org/info/Volunteer
[https://perma.cc/Y7A2-7K7G]. Volunteering helps to bring about local action and help
society, while allowing people to find volunteer opportunities. See A Brief History of Idealist,
supra note 259. See also Volunteer Resource Center, supra note 259.
260. Why is Volunteering Important?, supra note 259.
261. See id.
262. Id.
263. See Volunteering in MA, supra note 2.
264. Red Cross Urges Summer Blood and Platelet Donations to Prevent Seasonal
Shortage, AM. RED CROSS (May 18, 2015), http://www redcrossblood.org/news/ma/red-crossurges-summer-blood-and-platelet-donations-prevent-seasonal-shortage
[https://perma.cc/9LJK-GXKX] [hereinafter Red Cross Urges Donations].
265. Brian Lee, Girl Scout Numbers on Decline in Worcester Area over Volunteer
Shortage,
TELEGRAM.COM
(Oct.
19,
2014,
6:00
AM),
http://
www.telegram.com/article/20141019/NEWS/310199795
[https://perma.cc/Y3MZ-MNVR]
[hereinafter Girl Scout Numbers].
266. See Why is Volunteering Important?, supra note 259.
267. See, e.g., Red Cross Urges Donations, supra note 264; Girl Scout Numbers, supra
note 265.
268. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (2016). It is possible that an argument
could be made asserting that it is against public policy to allow volunteers to bring a legal claim
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CONCLUSION
Volunteering provides multiple benefits to both the volunteer and the
recipient of the volunteer efforts.269 These benefits take many forms
(physical, mental, social, professional, and economic) and are found with
service volunteers and donor volunteers.270 Regardless of the benefits
incurred, there is often a shortage of volunteers, and consequently, a
continual need for more volunteers.271 This shortage of volunteers has
been experienced first-hand in Massachusetts, where only about 25
percent of residents volunteer.272 When a business or organization refuses
a volunteer because of his membership in a protected class, the shortage
of volunteers is exacerbated.273
Currently, a volunteer in Massachusetts has limited statutory
protections against discrimination.274 Volunteers can bring a claim under
the Massachusetts civil rights statute only if the discrimination is the result
of “threats, intimidation or coercion, or attempt[ed] . . . threats,
intimidation, or coercion.”275 If a person is not permitted to volunteer
because of his membership in a protected class, he is denied the various
benefits afforded to volunteers, which would amount to a denial of
privileges and advantages.276 Assuming the business or organization is
soliciting volunteer efforts and has a principal place of operations in
Massachusetts, it would likely be considered a place of public
accommodation.277 Based on these criteria being met, the business or
organization would be discriminating in a place of public
accommodation.278 Therefore, Massachusetts should allow anyone who
is denied the ability to volunteer in a place of public accommodation based
on membership or perceived membership in a protected class the
opportunity to bring a discrimination claim under the Massachusetts
providing volunteer opportunities in an effort to avoid discrimination allegations. While it
would seem the public policy behind stopping discrimination would be more powerful, this
argument will not be analyzed in this Note.
269. See GRIMM JR. ET AL., supra note 200, at 3.
270. See, e.g., Horoszowski, 5 Surprising Benefits, supra note 13; Feigenbaum, supra
note 13.
271. See Paul Clolery, Troubling Numbers in Volunteering Rates, NON PROFIT TIMES
(Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.thenonprofittimes.com/news-articles/troubling-numbers-involunteering-rates/ [https://perma.cc/CB44-HDLU].
272. Volunteering in MA, supra note 2.
273. See Clolery, supra note 271.
274. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, §§ 11H–I (2016).
275. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 11H (2016).
276. See, e.g., Horoszowski, 5 Surprising Benefits, supra note 13; Feigenbaum, supra
note 13.
277. Cf. U.S. Jaycees v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 463 N.E.2d 1151, 1160
(Mass. 1984). See Local Fin. Co. of Rockland v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 242
N.E.2d 536, 538 (Mass. 1968).
278. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (2016).
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public accommodation anti-discrimination statute.279
When John and Jim were denied the opportunity to volunteer at the
food pantry, they were turned away because the manager of the food
pantry believed they were in a same-sex relationship. Similarly, the
manager refused John and Jim’s donations for the same reason. The denial
of the opportunity to volunteer and the rejection of the donation constitute
a denial of the benefits that are intrinsic to volunteering. Whereas John
and Jim currently would have no statutory protections available to them,
this proposed change in the scope of the Massachusetts public
accommodation anti-discrimination statute would afford John and Jim
statutory protections while also benefitting the public.

279.

See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (2016).

